I think I came close to tears at the sight of babies being thrown to troops as the West withdrew from Afghanistan, and the sense of complete futility of the past twenty years spent in the country. Given how the West seemed to have been blindsided, I’ve been giving some thought to the way in which the Taliban has negotiated with the West. I was put on this line of thought by Trump's recent rather erratic interview with Fox News where he referred to the Taliban as ‘great negotiators’. Those of you who have read my previous Newsletters and Linkedin content will know that I have a morbid fascination with Trump’s negotiation abilities, so that really caught my eye.
So what did Trump have to say? “What happened and what is happening in Afghanistan is unbelievable and we’re being set up by very tough people that are very great negotiators,” “I’ll tell you what, they’re great automatic negotiators, they’ve been fighting for a thousand years.” Although I’m not sure I quite understand the expression “automatic negotiators” it piqued my interest. Are the Taliban great negotiators? When I started looking I found a thoroughly interesting piece of research done in 2013 on the Taliban’s previous negotiating tactics and giving advice on how to negotiate with them in the future. In my eyes it shows that the Taliban is not so much ‘great negotiators’ (which is in fact highly unlikely as the research showed that there is not really one Taliban but a series of groups and sub-interests) as a misunderstood one. The research is not only fascinating in itself; it can be directly applied to any negotiations where there are cultural differences between the parties, or where you’re up against a large or chaotic organisation. In proof of this, I have a close contact who works a lot with Japanese industry; a lot of the comments made within the research chimed with what he has said of his experiences of negotiating in Japan. According to the 2013 research key findings on pre-2001 attempts to negotiate with the Taliban were as follows:
This meant successful meetings were often less goal focused; agendas were perceived by the Taliban as a list of demands and not as discussion points, so there was a need to take time to get to know each other, and take steps to avoid suggestions or issues being viewed as demands. At the outset of a negotiation, see if anyone in your team has a pre-existing positive relationship with the other party, rather than just looking at who might be seen as the best or most senior negotiator. And when preparing, think about if you need an agenda. A list of issues that come out of the discussions can be seen as being owned by both parties, rather than be preempted by one side’s document, one that is presented to the other side. This may cause distrust or a an automatic bias towards rejecting its contents.
The research found that it was important to understand the Taliban’s organisation and its perception of the world around them, otherwise agreements were reached with the ‘wrong’ people which were reversed when senior leaders later found out about them. This then made it more difficult to reach agreement again on that point. In the same way it is worth having a knowledge of the structure of the other side’s organisation, and be aware not only of who is able to make decisions but also whose input is politically needed if the agreement is going to ‘stick’: you might be in the room with a person with authority to reach agreement but are you in the room with the person who can bring the organisation together to back it?
Hand in hand with point 2 is also knowing who can help grow support for your proposals. With the Taliban, there is a younger generation of more junior leaders who have been schooled in a way that gives them a greater capacity to facilitate ‘cultural translation’; putting the West’s proposals in a language that will be more easily understood and approved by the more senior leaders. You should always think about who in the other side’s organisation might be more approachable to an early discussion, and help to identify ways in which a proposal might find more fertile ground. That is one reason why solicitors should also work hard to achieve a good working relationship with the other party’s solicitor, as both of them are more likely than their respective clients to have a common professional language, knowledge and culture that helps to understand and then translate requests or offers.
The research found that misunderstanding was often at the core of failure. Statements or demands were often seen as tactics that eroded trust. In the 1990’s China, for example, was facing violence from militant groups in Xinjiang who it was felt were using Afghanistan as a base. China explained the problems this was causing and asked the Taliban for help (instead of making demands) and this led to a successful intervention by the Taliban. It can help by writing out your requests or offers in three or four different ways to see if this helps re-frame them. Think how they will be judged by the other side; think about the way that they may read or hear them. Say them out loud to close contacts or colleagues who can help you to identify incendiary or unhelpful phrasing. This process can also make sure that you are offering what you intend to offer. In such instances, it can be useful to try to write out a draft consent order as this can often expose gaps in the wording of the offer.
The Taliban‘s senior members want to attend meetings where much has been agreed beforehand. But the West would often want to go straight to high-level meetings, on the basis it was perceived as a shortcut to a decision. The research showed that early higher level talks often failed as the more senior leaders weren’t prepared to have pressure put on them to make a decision there and then. Surprise in any event is rarely a good thing within any negotiations. The initial advantage of catching the other party off guard, and throwing them off balance, is usually then followed by a feeling of mistrust, and a wish not to compromise until they feel they are back on firmer ground.
As always first impressions count and it seems no more so than with the Taliban. It was interesting to see that the Taliban like to begin any meeting by outlining the evolution of its movement. The West needed to learn that therefore jumping straight into demands and proposals was not an appropriate way of replying to that sort of introduction. Instead the research suggested expressing concerns for health, education and poverty, to help to show an understanding of and concern for Afghanistan and its people, and thus start building a good relationship for negotiations. The advice given by the research is to take care that a relationship is built before contentious issues are raised, and that applies to all negotiations. Overall, as a casual outsider, one can see that negotiating with the Taliban is full of bear traps and potential cultural faux pas, but also that it is no different to any cross-cultural interaction or negotiation. One must be aware of the context, the societal differences and most of all the need to think and tread carefully. Recent events might be said to show that Afghanistan is the graveyard of hope for a more Western society, but the research shows us that so long as we are willing to learn lessons and change, we can still attempt to connect and be involved in some way with the unfolding events, even if they are outside of our control. The research can also be used to apply the lessons learned to other arenas, with the hope of greater success. Comments are closed.
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AuthorRichard Marshall is an Accredited Civil and Commercial Mediator with over 25 years experience as a Litigation Solicitor, as well as being a qualified Solicitor-Advocate. He is the founder of Striving to Settle, through which he works as a mediator and provides negotiation training. www.strivingtosettle.co.uk Archives
August 2022
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